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Abstract: The 1960s were a decade of important developments in the Balkans. Skopje’s 
stirring up of the issue of the supposed “Macedonian” minority led to a series of 
diplomatic clashes between Greece and Yugoslavia, culminating in the 1960–1962 
crisis. A major role in developments in the Balkans was played by the Soviet Union, 
which, directly or indirectly, greatly influenced the shaping of Yugoslav foreign policy. 
The crisis began in August 1960 when, for the first time since 1950, the Yugoslavia 
Foreign Ministry publicly raised the question of protecting the rights of the “Mace-
donian minority”. While the Athens-Belgrade crisis was not serious enough to lead 
them to break off diplomatic relations, it did have a catalytic effect on the shaping 
of Bulgarian policy with regard to the Macedonian question. After the restoration of 
democracy in Greece (1974), and despite her need for support from Yugoslavia on the 
Cyprus issue, the Karamanlis government did not repeat the “mistakes” of 1959. Bel-
grade, having secured in 1975 a renewal of the agreement on the free zone in the Port 
of Thessaloniki, did not insist on signing a border agreement. The Macedonian ques-
tion had become of no more than academic interest in the discussions of politicians 
on both sides of the border, and the crisis of 1960–62 merely a forgotten flare-up. 
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The 1960s were a decade of important developments in the Balkans.1 Sko-
pje’s stirring up of the issue of the supposed “Macedonian” minority led to 
a series of diplomatic clashes between Greece and Yugoslavia, culminating 
in the 1960–1962 crisis. A major role in developments in the Balkans was 
played by the Soviet Union, which, directly or indirectly, greatly influenced 
the shaping of Yugoslav foreign policy.
After the death of Stalin, the new Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, 
embarked on a de-Stalinization campaign in order to secure his position 
in the Soviet Union and the Socialist camp in general. In order to prevent 
Yugoslavia from adhering more closely to the West, he restored Soviet-Yu-
goslav relations, a move that was formalised with the signature of the decla-
1 This paper has resulted from my broader research into twentieth-century Balkan his-
tory, published in part in my book In the Shadow of the Macedonian Issue (Thessaloniki 
2007). The documentary sources and bibliography are quoted at the end of the paper.  
Balcanica XXXIX190
rations of Belgrade (1955) and Moscow (1956), by which the Soviet Union 
recognised Yugoslavia’s different road to Socialism. Nonetheless, Yugoslavia 
did not adhere to the Warsaw Pact, and Yugoslav foreign policy was based 
on the doctrine of maintaining an equal distance from East and West.
It was not long, however, before relations between Moscow and Bel-
grade soured. In October 1956 the reform movement in Hungary, fruit of 
that country’s de-Stalinization campaign, turned into an anti-Communist 
revolution; this was snuffed out by two Soviet military interventions. Yu-
goslavia’s attitude to the Hungarian question displeased the Soviets. Tito 
condemned the use of armed force, arguing that the first Soviet intervention 
was not necessary and the second was a necessary evil. The fate of Nagy and 
the other Hungarian political figures who sought asylum in the Yugoslav 
Embassy was a fresh cause of tension in Yugoslav-Soviet relations.
A typical example of the coolness between the two countries was 
Yugoslavia’s refusal to sign the “Declaration of the 12 Governing Com-
munist Parties”, which called for the Communist and Workers’ Parties to 
coordinate their common struggle for peace, democracy and socialism and 
indirectly recognised the Soviet Union’s leading role in the Socialist world. 
The Bulgarian government, which appeared to benefit from the tension that 
had been created, encouraged Bulgarian historians to trumpet the “distor-
tions their history had suffered at the hands of Skopjian historians”. An-
other green light was given in Khrushchev’s address to a congress of the 
Communist Party of Bulgaria, when he called Tito a “Trojan horse of im-
perialism”.
While this negative climate was chilling relations between Moscow 
and Belgrade, the latter’s co-operation with Athens was visibly increas-
ing. Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey had entered into a Balkan Friendship 
and Cooperation Agreement in 1953. Relations between the three were 
governed by the spirit of this Balkan Pact until the deteriorating climate 
between Greece and Turkey caused by the Cyprus conflict virtually ex-
tinguished it. Greece and Yugoslavia, on the other hand, had their own 
separate reasons for wanting to strengthen it. Greece, sure of Yugoslavia’s 
support in the Cyprus problem, believed that a rapprochement between 
the three countries would help resolve the matter. Yugoslavia, meanwhile, 
wanted to revive the Pact primarily for defensive reasons. Turkey, however, 
had turned its attention toward the Middle East in 1955 and was no longer 
interested in the Balkan Pact.
This Pact notwithstanding, the Greek and Yugoslav positions with 
regard to international and Balkan affairs were not the same. Greece and 
Yugoslavia reacted in different ways to US President Dwight Eisenhower’s 
decision to deploy missiles in NATO countries. The Karamanlis govern-
ment wanted to strengthen NATO, arguing that this was necessary in the 
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climate that had developed after the signing of the Zurich and London 
agreements “for the resolution of the Cyprus conflict”. When Romanian 
Prime Minister Chivu Stoica proposed a “missile-free Balkans”, the Greek 
government rejected the idea. In 1959 Soviet policy in the Balkans focused 
on preventing the deployment of NATO missiles in Greece. The Soviet 
Union threatened to install nuclear bases in Albania and Bulgaria if Greece 
gave in to American pressure, the aim being to frighten Greece, whose rela-
tions with those two countries were not good. Yugoslavia, however, fearing a 
stronger Soviet presence in the Balkans, supported Stoica’s proposition.
Despite the differences in their positions in international affairs, 
Greece and Yugoslavia continued to develop their bilateral co-operation. In 
June 1959 the two countries signed twelve agreements, fruit of the “Mixed 
Commission on Economic, Cultural and Technical Affairs” that had been 
set up in 1958. These agreements, most of them economic and technical, 
were accepted by the Greek political world without reaction, except for that 
on cross-border communication. This agreement provided that the border 
cards to be issued to facilitate freedom of movement in the predetermined 
border zone would be printed in the official languages of both countries. In 
practice this meant using the “Slav-Macedonian” tongue, which was one of 
the official languages of Yugoslavia. Greek opposition politicians, largely for 
reasons of domestic opposition policy, accused the Karamanlis government 
of recognising the “Slav-Macedonian” language and underestimating the 
Slav danger. The Karamanlis government replied that all it was recognis-
ing was the Yugoslav constitution. Greece could not prevent the use of the 
“Slav-Macedonian” tongue within Yugoslavia, but would in no case issue 
border cards in Greece in that language. As for the danger of Skopjian 
propaganda, Yugoslav foreign policy was, it stressed, determined in Bel-
grade and not in Skopje. The local authorities in some villages in Western 
Macedonia reacted very strongly: conditioned by the anti-Slav syndrome 
of the post-civil war era, they organised oath-taking ceremonies in which 
Slav-speakers swore never to use the Slav idiom again. These, however, were 
just isolated incidents, and were not instigated by the Greek government, 
which assured the Yugoslav government that it condemned such actions. In 
any case, Athens told Belgrade, and whatever the reaction, the agreements 
would be ratified.
Greece, however, which had placed its hopes in Yugoslavia to en-
sure the smooth functioning of cross-border communication and to prevent 
Skopje from stirring up any minority issues, was belied. In 1960 new factors 
on the international scene and in the Balkan region led to a cooling in rela-
tions between the two countries.
In 1960–61 the Cold War was heating up. The Soviet downing of 
an American spy plane taking photographs of military installations in the 
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Soviet Union sparked a fiery war of words and led to the failure of the Paris 
Peace Summit in May 1960. In this climate of international tension the 
Soviet Union decided to impose a radical solution on the Berlin issue by 
building a wall through the city (August 1961). In international matters 
concerning collective security (a missile-free Balkans, the Berlin question) 
Yugoslavia supported the Soviet Union, although it had already embarked 
on an independent foreign policy path.
The years 1960–61 also saw the break-up of the Socialist camp, with 
breaches between the Soviet Union and China and between the Soviet 
Union and Albania. The souring of relations between Albania and the So-
viet Union led to a blossoming of Albania’s relations with China and a 
rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia con-
demned China’s opportunism and supported the Soviet Union, which in 
Tito’s view posed no threat to his country.
These new circumstances had an impact on relations between Greece 
and Yugoslavia. When Skopje decided to revive the question of the “Mace-
donian minority” in Greece, Belgrade did not react. There were a number of 
reasons behind the stirring up of this issue. With the cooling-off in Soviet-
Yugoslav relations, the Bulgarian organisation MPO (Macedonian Patriotic 
Organisation) had become very active in America, denying the existence of 
a Macedonian ethnicity and raising the issue of the protection of the rights 
of the Bulgarian minority in Greece. The basic position of this organisation 
was a “united and independent Macedonia”. By raising the Macedonian 
question as a Bulgarian issue, the MPO gave Greece an argument against 
Skopje’s claims regarding a Macedonian ethnicity and Macedonian minori-
ties, regardless of the fact that the Bulgarian factor differed only formally 
from the Slav-Macedonian. In the early months of 1960, perhaps influenced 
by the signing of the Greek-Yugoslav agreements, the action of the Bulgar-
ian-Macedonians in America was stepped up and the Western Macedo-
nian Greek communities in Canada and America devoted themselves to 
the struggle to combat Bulgarian propaganda. This was a blow to Skopje, 
since the MPO, as an anti-Communist, Bulgarian-nationalist organisation, 
was a feared rival, until Communist Bulgaria overcame its ideological com-
plex sufficiently to counter-attack. The press in Northern Greece frequently 
cited both the Bulgarian propaganda the organisation was conducting in 
America and the defensive activity of the Greeks living there.
The issue of the return of Slav-Macedonian refugees from the East-
ern countries, particularly from Poland, was complicated by the fact that 
Yugoslavia could not absorb them in large numbers, while the Bulgarian 
government offered to resettle them in Bulgaria and to that end sent agents 
to Poland to win them over. The dispute between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia 
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over the ethnic identity of the Slavs of Macedonia had moved beyond the 
narrow confines of the Balkans.
In April-May 1960 a cause célèbre came up before the Permanent 
Court Martial in Athens, when a large group of Greek Communists were 
accused of spying for the international Communist movement. The defence 
statements attacked both the stance of the CPG on the Macedonian issue 
and the role of Yugoslavia in the Greek civil war, and most of the accused 
stressed the need for respecting the rights of the “Macedonian minority”.
In response to this trial, the Central Committee of the Union of 
Communists of Yugoslavia met on 18 May 1960 specifically to discuss the 
Macedonian question and Greek-Yugoslav relations. The position adopted 
by both Skopje and Belgrade was expressed by the Speaker of the House 
and former Premier of the FPR Macedonia, Lazar Koliševski, who stated 
that “the objective of the trial of the Communists in Greece was to strike 
fear into and to silence the Macedonian population, so that they would 
deny their ethnic identity”. He also opined that the Greek side “was abusing 
its relations with Yugoslavia so as to erase the Macedonian question” and, in 
closing, argued that it was a duty of the Yugoslav government to act vigor-
ously in the matter, since Greece and Bulgaria were doing the same.
A number of other political figures aligned themselves with Koliševski, 
among them Foreign Minister Koča Popović and Deputy Prime Minister 
Edvard Kardelj. By the time the conference closed, a coordinated policy, to 
be followed by Belgrade and Skopje, had been worked out: the Skopjian 
press would have a relatively free hand to stir up the minority issue and the 
federal government would pursue an active campaign through political an-
nouncements, without however seeking to cause a rupture in the country’s 
relations with Greece.
The crisis began in August 1960 when, for the first time since 1950, 
the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry publicly raised the question of protecting the 
rights of the “Macedonian minority”. A war of words promptly broke out 
between Greece and Yugoslavia, with both countries holding fast to their 
positions. Greece maintained that there was no question of a “Macedonian” 
minority in its territory and that the remaining Slav-speakers there con-
sidered themselves to be Greeks. Yugoslavia, for its part, accused the Greek 
government of essentially bringing the issue to the foreground (through the 
oath-taking ceremonies and the trial of Communists) and demanded the 
immediate recognition of the “minority”.
A meeting between Averoff and Popović held on the island of Brioni 
in July 1960 seemed to mark the beginning of a relaxation of the diplomatic 
and political tension that had been created. Averoff and Popović reached 
their first “gentlemen’s agreement”, which provided simply for mutual ef-
forts to prevent the issue from escalating into a serious dispute, but did 
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nothing to assuage the Greek government’s worries that Skopje would ex-
ploit the aspects of the agreement concerning cross-border communication. 
In a memorandum delivered to the Yugoslav Ambassador, the Greeks at-
tempted to direct the Yugoslav government’s attention to what was going 
on in the border zone. It cited the uncontrolled activity of certain Slav-
Macedonian circles, whose behaviour was an affront to the inhabitants of 
Western Macedonia: they were urging bilingual Greeks to declare them-
selves as “Macedonians”, encouraging them to speak “Slav-Macedonian”, 
and collecting oral accounts of the period of the Axis occupation and the 
civil war for a “national history of Macedonia”. The chief agents were the 
Slav-Macedonian refugees from Greek Macedonia in the FPRM, who had 
become a pressure group working on the government in Skopje.
The Karamanlis government might not have attached such impor-
tance to this sort of incidents had they not been accompanied by Yugo-
slav politicians’ official speeches insisting on the issue of the protection 
of the rights of the “Macedonian” minority. A characteristic example was 
Koliševski’s historically inaccurate speech at the Socialist Union Con-
gress in October 1960, which further inflamed the spirits. Once again the 
Speaker of the House in Skopje openly accused Greece of indifference to 
its obligations toward the “Macedonian” minority within its borders, which 
according to him had been established by the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920. He 
also accused the Greek press of supporting the activity (in America) of the 
MPO, which presented the Macedonian question as a Bulgarian issue and 
rejected Skopje’s position on the existence of a “Macedonian” nation.
Koliševski’s speech caused a political storm in Athens when it be-
came known that it had been made in the presence of Kardelj. The Greek 
diplomats considered this speech a breach of the Averoff-Popović gentle-
men’s agreement and hastened to demand explanations from the Yugoslav 
government. The Karamanlis government indeed had serious reasons to 
be worried about its survival, for the political statements that were issuing 
from Skopje were providing fuel for the opposition.
The Yugoslav government replied that the episodes in the border 
zone were isolated incidents and that Greece had no reason for concern, 
and promised to admonish the Yugoslav people to refrain from any political 
activity in Greece.
These developments in the Balkans also affected the final position of 
the Karamanlis government in the matter. As has been said, 1961 was the 
year when Albania broke off its relations with the Soviet Union, a develop-
ment that hastened the rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Yu-
goslavia. These re-alignments naturally affected Greek policy towards Alba-
nia; 1961 was also a year of intense activity of the Associations of Northern 
Epirotes, who felt that the moment had come for the liberation of Northern 
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Epirus. References to the Greek minority abounded in the Greek press. 
Athens hinted that it would find some formula for ending the state of war 
with Albania and extend financial help to the country if a solution to the 
(minority) issue of Northern Epirus was found.
Greece’s interest in the Greek minority in Northern Epirus spurred 
Skopje to publicize a similar interest in the “Macedonian minority” in 
Greece; and so, in November-December 1961, Skopje and Belgrade once 
again raised this issue. Skopje’s continual stirring up of a matter for which 
a compromise solution could have been found, coupled with Yugoslavia’s 
insistence on acting as Skopje’s custodian, forced the Karamanlis govern-
ment to halt the work of the Mixed Committee and unilaterally suspend 
cross-border communication in December 1961.
While Yugoslav politicians made no new public pronouncements re-
garding the “Macedonian minority” in 1962, their role was taken up with 
a vengeance by the press on both sides of the border. The crisis of 1960–62 
was brought to an end by the second Averoff-Popović gentlemen’s agree-
ment, in December 1962. On the basis of this agreement the two countries 
could adhere to their respective positions but had to avoid any kind of ac-
tion that might disturb relations between them.
While the Athens-Belgrade crisis was not serious enough to lead 
them to break off diplomatic relations, it did have a catalytic effect on the 
shaping of Bulgarian policy with regard to the Macedonian question. Pre-
mier Zhivkov’s government, fearing pressure from Yugoslavia and the Soviet 
Union to recognise a “Macedonian minority” in Bulgaria, officially decided 
in 1963 that there was no “historic Macedonian nation” and noted that the 
“Macedonian consciousness” in Yugoslav Macedonia should develop on an 
anti-Bulgarian basis.
In November 1964 George Papandreou’s government reactivated the 
border agreement, largely because he needed Yugoslavia’s support as regards 
Cyprus. The price he paid for this support was a general tolerance of the 
activity of the Slav-Macedonians who crossed into Greek Macedonia under 
the terms of the border agreement. The turbulence in Greek political life in 
1965–66 and the ongoing conflict in Cyprus distracted Athens’ attention 
from the Macedonian issue. As long as Yugoslav politicians refrained from 
making public declarations, Athens could relax.
One of the first actions of the dictatorship proclaimed on 21 April 
1967 was to denounce the border agreement. The reason given by the Kol-
lias government for this action (May 1967) was the systematic activity car-
ried out by Slav-Macedonian refugees. The nationalist policy adopted by the 
Greek dictatorship left no room for discussing a “Macedonian” language or 
minority.
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Nor did the Karamanlis government after the restoration of democ-
racy (1974), and despite Greece’s need for Yugoslavia’s support on the Cy-
prus issue, repeat the “mistakes” of 1959. Belgrade, having secured in 1975 
a renewal of the agreement on the free zone in the Port of Thessaloniki, did 
not insist on signing a border agreement. The Macedonian question had 
become of no more than academic interest in the discussions of politicians 
on both sides of the border, and the crisis of 1960–62 merely a forgotten 
flare-up. 
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